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NOTES
DUAL OFFICE HOLDING AND CONFLICTS IN

APPOINTIVE POWERS

Introduction
Recent events in New York 1 have brought sharply into focus

certain questions relative to dual office holding, the right to retain a
given office on accrual of eligibility to assume another office and conflicts in appointive power between executive and legislative branches
of state government, particularly in respect to the filling of vacancies
in elective offices. It has been-thought appropriate to discuss the
legal character of public office holding, the concept of dual office
holding and conflicts in appointive powers, especially in so far as they
are reflected in statutory provisions providing for vacancy filling.
Legal Charfacter of Public Office Holding
A public office has not generally been regarded as the private

property of the incumbent.2

It is not held by contract or grant' but

is regarded rather as a public trust,4 to be administered for the benefit

and in the interest of the people. It follows that rights in a public
office are limited 5 and not absolute. 6 Thus, an officer for a term has
no claim for salary
for the remainder thereof after he has been
7
removed for cause.
'Reference is made to the retention of his post as Attorney General of
New York by U.S. Senator Jacob K. Javits beyond the commencement of his
congressional term on January 3, 1957.

2See Wetzel v. McNutt, 4 F. Supp. 233 (S.D. Ind. 1933); Walton v.
Davis, 188 Ga. 56, 2 S.E.2d 603 (1939); Smith v. Thompson, 219 Iowa 888,
258 N.W. 190 (1934) ; State ex rel. Garland v. Guillory, 184 La. 329, 166 So.
94, 101 (1935) (dictum).
3 See Grenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99 (1890) ; Condon v. Metropolitan Dist., 130 Conn. 473, 35 A.2d 840 (1944); State ex rel. Garland v.
Guillory, supra note 2; State ex rel. Goren v. Barthalow, 150 Ohio St. 499,
83 N.E.2d 393 (1948).
4 See Wetzel v. McNutt, supra note 2; Smith v. Thompson, supra note 2;
Middlesboro v. Kentucky Util. Co., 284 Ky. 833, 146 S.W.2d 48 (1940); In re
Opinion of the Justices, 303 Mass. 631, 22 N.E.2d 49 (1939) ; In re Olsen, 211
Minn. 114, 300 N.W. 398 (1941).
5 See Malkin v. Chicago, 6 Ill. App. 2d 151, 127 N.E.2d 145 (1955); Cowan
v. State ex rel. Scherck, 57 Wyo. 309, 116 P.2d 854 (1941).
6 See Reese v. Dempsey, 48 N.M. 417, 152 P.2d 157 (1944).
Weinstein v. United States, 74 F., Supp. 554 (Ct. Cl. 1947); Scott v.
Crump. 106 Mich. 288, 64 N.W. 1 (1895); Fairless v. Cameron County Water
Imp. Dist. No. 1, 25 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
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The right to resign a public office is well recognized 8 though,
like the right to hold office, it is not absolute. 9 Accordingly a resignation submitted merely in order to avoid performance of some
specific duty 10 or to thwart litigation will be treated as ineffective."
Likewise, the state may place various restrictions on the retention of public office. Thus, the privilege of continuance in office is
terminable in the event of physical or mental disability where a statute
so provides 12 though such disability does not ipso facto create a
vacancy in the absence of statute. 13 Conviction of a crime has been
held a ground for removal. 14 In this connection, there is authority
for the proposition that removal may follow even where defendant is
acquitted of charges against him.'15
In Montana, the seeking by an elective officer of another elective
office while continuing to hold the first was at one time declared by
statute to result in an automatic vacancy in the first office. 16

The

constitutionality of this statute was upheld except insofar as it made
a distinction betveen individuals holding office for a term longer than
two years and those elected for a term of two years or less.' 7 This
statute, however, was later repealed. Likewise, one may-be removed
from office for serving on a political committee or as manager of a
political campaign where a statute so provides.' 8 Vacancy may result
also from participation in private activities inconsistent with public
office holding, such as engaging in business for a public utility
corporation.' 9
'Dual Office Holding
At common law it was the rule that acceptance by a public officer
of a second incompatible office terminates ipso facto the tenure of the
8 See Rockingham. County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir.
1929) ; Sadler v. Jester, 46 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Tex. 1942) ; Cassedy v. Wilkins,
137 Misc. 748, 244 N.Y. Supp. 445 (Sup., Ct. 1930) ; People ex rel. Rosenberg
v. Keating, 112 Colo. 26, 144 P.2d 992 (1944); People ex tel. McCarthy v.
Barrett, 365 I1. 73, 5 N.E.2d 453 (1936).
0 See People ex tel. McCarthy v. Barrett, supra note 8; Commonwealth
ex tel. Wootton v. Berninger, 255 Ky. 451, 74.S.W.2d 932 (1934).
10 People ex rel. -Rosenberg v. Keating,. supra note 8.
1 State e;r tel. Wilson v. Bush, 141 Tenn. 229, 208 S.W. 607 (1919).
V2 See, e.g, Sullivan v. Whitney, 25 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
13

See, e.g., State v. Pidgeon, 8 Blackf. 132 (Ind. 1846).

14 See Bryson v. State, 96 Okla. Crim. 49, 248 P.2d 253 (1952).

15 Evans v. Monaghan, 306 N.Y. 312, 118 N.E.2d 452 (1954) ; People e.r tel.
Wood v. Department of Health, 144 App. Div. 628, 129 N.Y. Supp. 255 (1st
Dep't 1911) (per curiam), affd, 202 N.Y. 610, 96 N.E. 1127 (1911) ; see Finck
v. Bliss, 205 Misc. 775, 129 N.Y.S.2d 64 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
16 Laws of Mont. 1937, c. 116, § 1-7; repealed, Laws of Mont. 1943, c. 27,

§1.

Mulholland v. Ayers, 99 P.2d 234 (Mont. 1940).
28 See Ekern v. McGovern, 154 Wisc. 157, 142 N.W. 595 (1913).
1 See Boone v. State, 170 Ala. 57, 54 So. 109 (1911).
17
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acceptor in the first office. 20 It has not been found feasible to construct a sufficiently broad and comprehensive definition of the term
"incompatible" to cover all possible situations that may arise. Courts
have generally contented themselves with the application of certain
criteria to individual fact patterns. Among the circumstances that
may render two offices incompatible are inconsistency of function 21
or subordination of one office to the other. 22 Ultimately, the determination of the existence or non-existence of incompatibility between
any two public offices must await the arrival of specific cases viewed
against the background of then prevailing conditions.
Federal Constitutional Provision
The origins of the provision in the Federal Constitution against
dual office holding can be traced back at least as far as the Act of
Settlement. 23 It was therein enacted "that no person who has an office
or place of profit under the King, or receives a pension from the
crown, shall be capable of serving as a member of the house of
commons." 24 Subsequently this statute was repealed 25 and replaced
by an enactment of somewhat less stringent character. 26 That the
problem was not thereby solved in England can be seen by the fact
that further legislation was necessary, culminating in the Civil List
Act of 1782.27
The Articles of Confederation incorporated a provision to the
effect that a delegate to Congress should be ineligible to hold any office
under the United States ".

.

. for which he, or another for his benefit

receives any salary, fees or emolument of any kind." 28
Various proposals with regard to dual office holding were considered by the Constitutional Convention which met at Philadelphia
20 See State v. Bus, 135 Mo. 325, 36 S.W. 636 (1896) ; State v. Mayor of
Jersey City, 63 N.J.L. 96, 42 Ati. 782 (1899); State ex rel. Kingsbury v.
Brinkerhoff, 66 Tex. 45, 17 S.W. 109 (1886) ; Rex v. Patteson, 4 B. & Ad. 9,

110 Eng. Rep. 358 (K-B. 1832); Millard v. Thatcher, 2 T.R. 81, English Ruling

Cas. 320 (1787).
21 See Macrum v. Board of Supervisors, 141 Misc. 358, 252 N.Y. Supp. 546
(Sup. Ct. 1931), aff'd sub. nom., Macrum v. Hawkins, 235 App. Div. 370,
257 N.Y. Supp. 287 (2d Dep't 1932), rev'd on other grounds, 261 N.Y. 193,
184 N.E. 817 (1933) ; People ex rel. Bagshaw v. Thompson, 55 Cal. App. 2d
147, 130 P.2d 237 (1942) ; Baker v. Dixon, 295 Ky. 279, 174 S.W.2d 410 (1943) ;
Russell v. Worcester County, 323 Mass. 717, 84 N.E.2d 123 (1949) ; Kobylarz
v. Mercer, 130 N.J.L. 44, 31 A.2d 208 (1943).
22 Tappan v. Helena Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n, 196 Ark. 1023, 104 S.W.2d
458 (1937) ; Knuckles v. Board of Educ., 272 Ky. 431, 114 S.W2d 511 (1938) ;
Gaw v. Ashley, 195 Mass. 173, 80 N.E. 790 (1907); Attorney Gen. ex ret.
Moreland v. Detroit, 112 Mich. 145, 70 N.W. 450 (1897).
23 12 & 13 WiLL. 3, c. 2 (1700).
24 Ibid.
25 4 ANNE c. 8 (1705).
266 ANNE c. 7 (1707).
27 22 GEo. 3, c. 82 (1782).
28 ARTiCLES OF CONrwFEA TIoN art.

V, cl. 2.
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in 1787 before the language presently in force was agreed upon.
Among the suggestions that were rejected by the convention, one
29
would have prohibited Congressmen from occupying state offices
for
and another would have made members of Congress ineligible
federal office for one year after the expiration of their term.3 0 The
clause eventually adopted reads as follows:
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was

elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United
States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have
been encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the
United31States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in
Office.

There are seen to be three distinct prohibitions in this provision.
The first is that a Congressman cannot be appointed to a federal civil
office until the term during which such office was created has expired,
if he was a member of Congress during that term. Secondly, a Congressman cannot be appointed to a federal civil office until the term
during which the emoluments of such office were increased has expired, if he was a member of Congress during that term. Thirdly, no
federal officeholder is eligible to Congress while he continues to hold
the federal office.
Interesting devices have at times been employed to circumvent
this enactment. Thus in 1909 President Taft expressed his intention
to appoint Senator Knox as Secretary of State. It was pointed out
that Knox would be constitutionally ineligible to the office since the
compensation thereof had been increased during his term in the
Senate. Congress therefore passed an act reducing the salary involved
to the level prevailing before the increase and Senator Knox was
thereafter appointed to the Cabinet. 32 It is to be observed that the
dual office holding clause does not bar Congressmen from holding
state office during the term for which they have been elected. For
example, Senator La Follette retained his position as Governor of
Wisconsin until January, 1906, nohvithstanding the fact that the
Senate, after his election thereto, had met in special session the
preceding March. 33 It is interesting to note that there is no constitutional provision against dual federal office holding in general. There
prohibiting dual lucrative offices to
is however a statutory provision
federal officers "and employees. 34

29

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FORMATION OF THE UNION

3o Ibid.
31 U.S.

CoNsT. art. I,

287, 803.

§ 6, cl. 2.

321 WILLOUGHBY,'THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNrrm

1929).

33 Id. at 606.
2428 STAT. 205 (1894), 5 U.S.C. §62 (1952).

STATES

607 (2d ed.
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State Constitutional and Statutory Provisions
Many states embody provisions against dual office holding in
their Constitutions. 5 Typically the provisions apply to judges and
members of the legislature. Characteristic of 'such an enactment with
regard to state judges is that of Wisconsin."0 In 1944 suit was
brought under this provision to bar a Wisconsin state judge from
candidacy in a primary *elction for the Republican nomination for
United States Senator. The court held that the jurisdiction to pass
on the qualifications of its members vested by the, Federal Constitution in the
Senate 87 was 'exclusive and not subject to review
38
elsewhere.
In the face of such a limitation on their application, it is to be
seen that state provisions of this character are not fully effective to
accomplish the purpose for which they are intended..
New York
The New York Constitution contains two major provisions with
respect to dual office holding. One declares that,.,acceptance .by a
member of the Legislature of office under the United States or in the
state or municipal governments ipso facto vacates his seat in the
Legislature. 39 Under the second provision, votes cast
for a judge in
40
an election for a post other than judicial are void.
There is no general statutory enactment in New York covering
dual office holding. 41 Statutes of limited application dealing with the
problem include the Second Class Cities Law, 42 the Village
Law, 43 the
4
Civil Service Law 4'and the New York City Charter. 5
s5 E.g., ILx. CONST. art. 4, § 3; IND. CoNsT. arL 2, § 9; IowA CONST. artL 3,
§§21,
3 22; N.J. CONST. art. 4, §5; OHIo ONT. art 2, § 4.
6 Wisc. CONST. art. 7, § 10.
37 "Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum

to do-Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may
be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner,
and under such Penalties as each House may provide." U.S. CoNSr. art. I,

§ 5, cl.
1.

38 State ex rel. Wettengel v. Zimmerman, 249 Wise. 237, 24 N.W2d 504
(1946).
39 N.Y. CONST. art. 3, § 7.
40 N.Y. CoNsr. art. 6, § 19.
Expressly excluded from this provision are

justices of the peace and police justices.
41 The general statutory provision dealing With the occurrence of vacancies
is Public Officers taw Setion 30:
42 N.Y. SECOND CLASS Cirrus LAW § 19.
43

N.Y. ViLLAGE L w §,42.

44"N.Y. Cirv. SEmv. LAW § 42.
4
5 N.Y.C. CHARTER § 895. See

Hulbert v. Craig, 124 Misc. 273, 207 N.Y.
Supp. 710 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mere., 213 App. Div. 865, 209 N.Y. Supp. 850 (1st
Dep't), aff'd mem., 241 N.Y. 525, 150 N.E. 539 (1925).
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In Childs v. Moses,46 the Park Commissioner was appointed by
the Mayor of New York to the City. Planning Commission, both of
which were unsalaried posts. It was held that such an appointment
did not violate the dual office holding provision of the City Charter,
so as to vacate the first office, since the charter elsewhere provided 47
that a Park Commissioner was not to be ineligible to hold another
unsalaried office. 48
Conflict in Appointive Power between Legislative and Executive
Branches of State Government
It is a fact of American history that legislative -and executive
branches of colonial governments grew up in conflict" ofie with the
other. As a corollary of the prevailing hostility to the British
monarch, colonial assemblies sought to deprive the executive -of as
much power as possible. This clash continued beyond cbcloniail times
virtually to the present day and accounts in great measfie f6r &istifig
restrictions on the power of the Anerican governor.49
This tendency is clearly seen with regard to limitations' imposed
on the appointive power of the state executive ancthis powv;erto remove officers- and fill vacancies. In the first place some of the most
importanf officials are elected and tfuis largely independent of the
Governor. ° Further, most major appointments and removals must
be made with the advice and consent of the upperhouse of the l_4gislature. 1 MoreoVier, some states vest5 2initial appointive power in the
Legislature, as in the case of judges.
In New York the pattern is similar to that prevailing .in other
states. There are four statewide, elective,.offices-Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General and Comptroller.53 , The general
appointiye power is vested by the New York Constitution in the
Governor acting with the advice and consent of the Senate.5 4 Thirteen
of the nineteen state departments are directly subject to the appointive
power of the Governor. 5 In at -least one significant instance initial
46 265 App. Div. 353, 38 N.Y.S.2d 704 (Ist Dep't 1942), aff'd without opinion,

29047N.Y. 823, 50 N.E2d 235 (1943).
N.Y,C, CHARTER § 531.

48 Childs v. Moses, 265 App. Div. 353, 38 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1st Dep't 1942),

aff'd without opinion, 290 N.Y. 828, 50 N.E2d 235 (1943).

49 See MACDONALD, STATE AND LOCAL-GovERMENT IN THE UNrITED STATES
THE RoOrs OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 558-'(1938).
50See CouNcIL OF STATE GOVENmETES BOOK OF THE STATES 153

96 (1955); NvrFES,
(Table 1) (1956).

Ibid,

5
52

See MACDONALD, STATE

AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN

139 5 (1955).

THE UNITED STATES

3 See CALDWELL, THE GoVENMENT AND ADmixisTRATION OF, NEW YORx

(1954).
5

4 N.Y. CONsT. art. 5, § 4.
55 See CALDWELL, op. cit. supra note 53, at 91-92.

77
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appointive power is vested in,the Legislature. For example, the
Education Law provides for the election of members of the Board of
Regents by that body. 56
The right to fill vacancies in public office is another important
phase of the appointive power. Vacancies are generally filled either
by the Governor acting alone or with the advice and consent of the
Senate, or by the Legislature. Where provision is made for the filling
of vacancies by the Governor, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, it is generally stipulated that such vacancies are to be filled by
the Governor alone, if the Legislature is not-in session. 57 In the case
of vacancies in the statewide elective offices of Comptroller and
Attorney General appointments are made by the Legislature if in
session, otherwise by the Governor.58
An important consideration is the period for which officers, appointed by various means to fill vacancies, are to hold office. A
distinction must be drawn. between initially elective offices and those
which are appointive in the first instance. Where an office is made
elective by the Constitution, the term of office of one appointed to
fill a-vacancy therein extends until the commencement of the political
year next succeeding the first annual election after the vacancy
occurs.5 9

In the case of elective offices not required to be such by

the Constitution, one appointed to fill a vacancy holds office until
commencement of the
first political year after which the vacancy can
60
be filled by election.
It is further provided that where a vacancy occurs before September 20th of any year in an office authorized to be filled at a general
election, such vacancy shall be filled at the next general election held
thereafter unless the Constitution otherwise provides, 61 or unless the
post has previously been filled at a special election. This provision 6is2
not applicable to the'offices of Governor or Lieutenant Governor.
Where a vacancy occurs in an office originally appointive, the interim
appointment is made by the same officer or authority entitled to make
an appointment for a full term, and tenure of.the one appointed is for
the balance' of the unexpired term.68
If the initial appointment Was required to be made by the Governor with the. advice and consent of the Senate, and the Legislature
is in session at the time of the vacancy, it may be filled in the same
manner for the balance of the term.6 If, under such circumstances,
56

N.Y. EDUC. LAW

§ 202.

5T E.g., N.Y. CoNsr. art. 6, §§ 4, 6, 16.
5s8
N.Y. Pun. OFcERs LAW § 41.

59 Id.§38.
60

Ibid.

As it does, for example, in the case of Comptroller and Attorney General.
See N.Y. CoNsT. art. 5, § 1.
62 N.Y. Pui. OsrsicEs LAW § 42.
63 Id.§38.
64 Id. § 39.
61
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the Legislature is not in session at the time of the occurrence of the
vacancy, it may be filled by the Governor for a term which will expire
either on the appointment and qualification of a successor or, in any
event, twenty days after the commencement of the next session of the
Senate.65
To the degree that certain state offices fall wholly or partly outside the Governor's appointive power it is clear that governmental
efficiency is likely to suffer. It can readily be appreciated that this
dichotomy in appointive and vacancy filling power provides a potential source of friction between the executive and legislative branches
in our state government.
The most recent illustration of difficulty in this area involved the
former Attorney General of this State, Jacob K. Javits. At the statewide election in November, 1954, Mr. Javits was elected to the office
of Attorney General for a four year term commencing January 1,
1955, scheduled to terminate on January 1, 1959. In 1956 he accepted
the Republican nomination for the United States Senate and was
elected to that office in November, 1956. His term of office in Congress began on January 3, 1957 but the Republican-dominated New
York Legislature which, if in session, has authority to fill vacancies
in the Office of Attorney General,6 6 was not scheduled to meet until
January 9, 19 57.67 The Attorney General, therefore, retained his
office until the Legislature met. Only then did he tender his resignation and allow himself to be sworn in to the Senate. The Legislature
then filled the vacancy by appointing a Republican, Louis Lefkowitz,
presumably for the remainder of the unexpired term.68
Mr. Javits, of course, was not guilty of violation of any dual
office holding provisions whether state or federal, since the only office
he held prior to the ninth of January, was that of Attorney General.
It is true, however, that Mr. Javits, for a period of six days, deprived
the most populous state in the union of one-half of its representation
in the United States Senate. While the time element involved was
small it should be remembered that there is nothing presently in the
law that would have prevented Mr. Javits from retaining his state
post for the remainder of the term and thereafter exercise his privilege
of taking the oath in the Senate.
It is felt that the type of problem illustrated in this instance can
best be solved by legislation. A full solution can be reached only by a
05 Ibid.
66 Id. § 41.
67 "The political year and legislative term shall begin on the first day of
January; and the legislature shall every year, assemble on the first Wednesday

after the first Monday in January." N.Y. CoNsT. art. 13, § 9.
68 This is so since Article 5, Section 1, of the New York Constitution
provides as follows:

" . . No election of a Comptroller or an Attorney-General shall be
had except at the time of electing a governor... " N.Y. CNsT. art. 5, § 1.
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combination of federal and state enactments. The following specific
changes in the law are therefore recommended:
(1) A federal statute requiring the acceptance or rejection of
federal elective office immediately on accrual of eligibility therefor in
the absence of sickness or other legitimate disability.
(2) A state statute or constitutional provision declaring a
vacancy in the office of one to whom a right to take a second incompatible office has accrued and which second office has not been
declined.
(3) A state statute or constitutional provision vesting the power
to fill vacancies in elective state offices in one authority regardless of
whether the Legislature is in or out of session. 69
Unless some such effective safeguards are provided to cover these
gaps in the existing law relative to filling vacancies in public offices,
a recurrence of difficulties such as occurred in the Javits and
La Follette cases is to be anticipated.

THE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

Introduction
Within the past two decades, a defense formerly interposed
rarely has been pleaded with increasing frequency in the federal
courts. Due to the tremendous growth of federal police legislation
enacted during this period, it has become a recognized fact that a few
unlawful practices are encouraged and condoned by a large class of
-citizens. As a result, federal police officers have found it necessary
oto.resort to various artifices in order to enforce.the law and punish
its violation. Nevertheless, the primary duty "of a law enforcement
officer is to prevent, not to punish crime.1 Therefore, where the
criminal design does not originate with the accused but is conceived
in the mind of a government official, the accused may validly claim
the defense of entrapment.
The classic and most frequently cited definition of entrapment
is that formulated by Supreme Court Justice Roberts in the case of
S69 In the close of the legislative session, the Legislature passed a bill [A. Int.
No. 2830] providing that if a vacancy occurs in the offices of Attorney General
or Comptroller, while the Legislature is not in session, the duties of the office
will be filled by a deputy until the Legislature can meet and appoint a successor.
' See Newman v. United States, 299 Fed. 128, 131 (4th Cir. 1924); Butts
v. United States, 273 Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1921).

